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Abstract 
We study a two echelon supply chain with AR(1) demand and unit replenishment lead-times. Each echelon 
of the supply chain uses conditional expectation to generate MMSE forecasts.  Both echelons use these 
forecasts inside the “Order-Up-To” policy to generate replenishment orders.  We investigate 3 different 
scenarios:  The first is when each echelon aims to minimize their own inventory holding and backlog costs.  
The second scenario is concerned with an altruistic retailer who is willing and able to sacrifice some of his 
own performance for the benefit of the total supply chain.  He does this by smoothing the demand he places 
on the manufacturer by using a matched proportional controller in the inventory and WIP feedback loops.  
The third scenario is concerned with an altruistic retailer with two unmatched controllers. The matched 
controller case outperforms the traditional case by 14.1%; the unmatched controller case outperforms the 
matched controller case by 4.9%. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Assuming AR(1) demand, we study a serially linked two-
echelon supply chain that exploits a generalized order-up-
to OUT policy with unmatched (that is, independent), 
feedback controllers at the first echelon (the retailer) and a 
traditional OUT policy at the second echelon (the 
manufacturer). We also assume that minimum mean 
square error forecasting is used and unit lead-times are 
present at each echelon. 
The benefit from the retailer’s altruistic behavior enabled by 
the generalized OUT policy with unmatched feedback 
controllers will be investigated, [1].  Each player acts to 
minimize global inventory costs.  To quantify its benefit, 
this strategy will be compared with other two strategies; 1) 
a traditional strategy where each player minimizes local 
inventory costs [2], and 2) an altruistic strategy achieved by 
the generalized OUT policy with matched feedback 
controllers [3].  
As an indicator of the supply chain performance, we will 
employ a metric that consists of the sum of the stationary 
standard deviation of the net inventory levels at each 
echelon. This is a valid approach when safety stock have 
been optimized via the newsvendor principle as inventory 
costs are then linearly related to the standard deviation to 
the inventory levels, [4].  We also quantify the bullwhip 
effect in the supply chain. 
We reveal the exact analytical expressions of the 
performance indicators. We highlight that the generalized 
OUT policy with unmatched controllers enable us to 
manipulate the dynamics of a supply chain with higher 
degree of freedom than the generalized OUT policy with 
matched controllers. Furthermore, we also discuss what 
kind of information should be shared between these two 
players to achieve the benefits from the altruistic strategy 
we highlight herein. 
 
 
2 DIFFERENCE EQUATION REPRESENTATION OF 
THE TWO-ECHELON SUPPLY CHAIN  
We assume the demand faced by the retailer is a mean 
centered autoregressive stochastic process of the first 
order.  Thus, 
 tdtdt dd    )( 1,1,1 ,   (1) 
and the demand faced by the manufacturer in the second 
echelon is the retailers order,  
tt od ,1,2   .     (2) 
In Eq (1),   is the autoregressive constant (-1<  <1), dt 
is the demand at time t and d  is the average demand.  
We assume dd  4  so that the possibility of negative 
demand is negligible. t  is a stochastic white noise 
process.  In Eq (2), ot is the orders at time t. 
We will also assume that there is a unit replenishment 
lead-time at each echelon.   Additionally, there is a one 
period, order of events delay.   Thus at both echelons 
(where the first part of the subscript is used to indicate the 
echelon in question; x=1 for the retailer and x=2 for the 
manufacturer), the following inventory balance equation 
holds, 
2,,1,,   txtxtxtx odnsns  ,    (3) 
where ns is the net stock (inventory on hand).  In each 
ordering policy  we will also need two forecasts of demand.  
One of these forecasts is the conditional expectation of the 
demand in the next period and this is used to generate a 
desired WIP (or pipeline, orders placed but not yet 
received) target.   The other forecast is the conditional 
expectation of demand in the period after the 
replenishment order arrives, that is, the forecast of demand 
in the next, next period.  For the retailer these forecasts are  
ttt ddEdwip ,11,1,1 ][       (4) 
ttt ddEd ,1
2
2,1,1 ][ˆ       (5) 
However, these two forecasts are considerably more 
complex for the manufacturer.   They are 
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We may use these forecasts in the following difference 
equation to generate orders (which holds at both 
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echelons),  
   1,,,,, 11ˆ  txtxtxtxtx odwipTwnstnsTido   (8) 
These last few difference equations (Eqs 6-8) contain 
some new notation.  The first is tns, the target net stock, a 
time invariant target safety stock that is used to ensure a 
desired fill-rate or availability of stock is achieved.   The 
other two new terms are Ti and Tw.  These are linear 
feedback gains in the net stock and WIP feedback loops 
respectively.   Feedback gains are a very simple and very 
well known technique from the field of control theory for 
manipulating the response of a dynamic system.  When 
Tw=Ti=1 we say then the supply chain consists of two 
serially linked, “traditional” OUT policies; when Tw=Ti, we 
say there are “matched controllers; when TiTw   we say 
there are “unmatched controllers”.   
 
3 THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
We will consider minimising the following objective function 
][][ 21 NSVarNSVarJ  . (9) 
This is an appropriate objective function when there are 
inventory holding and backlog costs that are linear in the 
inventory position in cases when tns has been set to the 
critical fractile to minimize the costs via the newsboy 
principle. The fact that we have simply added the two 
standard deviations together also implies that the retailer’s 
inventory holding and backlog costs are as important as 
the manufacturer’s inventory holding and backlog costs. 
[3] shows that setting Ti=Tw=1 at the manufacturer (the 
second echelon) yields a minimum value of J in a given 
scenario. Therefore, in our two-echelon model, only the 
first echelon (the retailer) exploits the feedback controllers 
(Ti and Tw) to manipulate the dynamics of the supply chain.  
The manufacturer simply uses a traditional order-up-to 
policy with MMSE forecasting to minimise J.   This is a 
natural consequence of our objective function, (Eq 9). If the 
objective function contains bullwhip related costs then this 
does not hold and the manufacturer should incorporate 
feedback controller(s) into his replenishment rule.  This is 
outside the scope of this short conference paper.  
However, we will quantify order variance at both echelons 
in our model for completeness. 
In the rest of the paper we will compare three scenarios:    
 The traditional, local optimisation.   This scenario 
considers the case when both the retailer and the 
manufacturer are solely concerned with minimising their 
own, local inventory holding and backlog costs.  We will 
study this scenario in section 4. 
 The altruistic retailer, global optimisation with matched 
controllers.  This scenario considers the case when the 
retailer is able and willing to alter his replenishment rule 
(by tuning Ti) in order to minimise the total supply chain 
costs. We assume in this case that the retailer uses a 
generalised OUT policy with matched controllers, 
Tw=Ti.  We will study this scenario in section 5. 
 The altruistic retailer, global optimisation with 
unmatched controllers. We will study this scenario in 
section 6 and is essentially the same as the previous 
strategy but with independent, unmatched controllers in 
the retailer’s replenishment rule, that is TiTw .  
 
4 ANALYSIS OF THE TRADITIONAL OUT POLICY 
SCENARIO; THE LOCAL OPTIMISATION 
Here the retailer uses Ti=Tw=1 and thus the supply chain 
consists of two serially linked OUT policies with MMSE 
forecasting.   As Ti=Tw=1 there are no stability issues in 
the supply chain and the variance of the two net stock 
positions turns out to be 
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These expressions for the variances may, in general, be 
obtained by a variety of ways, from stochastic analysis [2], 
via the frequency domain [5], control theory [6], or state 
space methods [7].   However we will not provide further 
details here due to space requirements.  Figure 1 
illustrates the inventory costs (via the standard deviations 
used in the objective function, Eq (9)) as a function of the 
autoregressive parameter,  . 
 
 
Figure 1: The inventory variances in the traditional supply 
chain 
 
The variance expressions for the demand and the two 
order rates are; 
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which have been plotted in Figure 2.  Note from Figure 2 
that when 0  then a bullwhip effect exists as 
Var[O1]>Var[D1] and Var[O2]>Var[D1].   
 
 
 
Figure 2: Order variances in the traditional supply chain 
 
5 ANALYSIS OF THE GENERALISED OUT POLICY 
SCENARIO WITH MATCHED CONTROLLERS 
By setting Tw=Ti, at the retailer we have matched feedback 
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controllers.  This yields a new set of variance ratio 
formulas.  These are: 
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From Eq (15) we can see that the valid range of Ti to 
ensure stability is Ti5.0 . We may use these 
variance ratios in the objective function (Eq 9) and 
determine the Ti that minimises the objective function, Ti*.  
Analytically this appears to be very difficult to achieve.  
However, using numerical techniques is considerably less 
complex and results in the following graphical relationship, 
see Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.   The optimal Ti when matched controllers exist 
with an altruistic retailer 
 
Using this optimal Ti inside the objective function results in 
Figure 4 which describes the minimised inventory costs in 
our supply chain. 
 
 
Figure 4.   The objective function with matched controllers 
at Ti=Ti* with an altruistic retailer 
 
The general expressions for the order variances are given 
by Eqs (17) and (18).  
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      (18) 
When Ti has been set to Ti* then the order variances can 
be plotted as shown in Figure 5. Comparison of Figures 2 
and 5 shows that the altruistic contribution of the retailer 
results in a smoothing of the retailers order variance.  
Thus, if the retailer incurs some bullwhip related costs in 
his retail, warehousing or transportation activities, then he 
may in fact, be even more willing to use the proportional 
feedback controller to minimize costs at the supplier than 
this stylized analysis suggests. 
 
 
Figure 5.   The demand and order variances with matched 
controllers at Ti=Ti* with an altruistic retailer 
 
6 ANALYSIS OF THE GENERALISED OUT POLICY 
SCENARIO WITH UN-MATCHED CONTROLLERS 
As there are two unmatched controllers then there is a 
need to conduct a stability analysis at the retailer.  There is 
no need to consider such issues at the manufacturer as 
here Ti=Tw=1 which results in a stable system.  Thus the 
analysis for the generalised OUT policy with unmatched 
controllers consists of a two stage approach.  
6.1 Stability analysis 
Stability can be readily investigated via transfer functions 
and we will exploit Jury’s Inners approach to conduct the 
analysis, [8].  This transfer function of the retailers order is 
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It is known that stability only depends upon feedback loops 
and thus we may ignore the feed-forward autoregressive 
term. Setting 0  and simplifying results in 
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Jury’s stability test requires us to expand out the 
denominator and collect together powers of z. 
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The first part of Jury’s stability test is to ensure that A(1)>0 
where     11  zzAA . Thus it follows that Tw>0. 
The second stage of Jury’s test is that     011  An .   
This is true iff, 
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The third and final stage of Jury’s stability test is that 
certain matrices of the co-efficient of the denominator of 
the systems transfer function are positive innerwise. 
Because our transfer is only of second order, this criteria  
easily reduces to the fact that 
Tw
TwTi  1
     (23) 
and 
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Tw
TwTi  1 .     (24) 
Numerical investigation reveals that (24) is non critical as it 
is entirely encompassed by (22).   It is interesting to note 
that the stability bound in first step of Jury’s test results in 
Tw>0, but (23) shows us that Tw can in fact be negative.  
Careful investigation shows that the unstable region of Tw, 
becomes stable when Tw<-1.   For confirmation a more 
direct stability test is given in [9] and results in Tw>0, Eq 22 
and Eq 23.  The redundant condition produced by Jury’s 
Inners Test is not generated. Figure 6 illustrates the 
stability region. 
 
 
Figure 6: The stability boundary for the generalized OUT 
policy with unit lead-times 
 
6.2 Variance analysis 
The variance of the retailer’s net stock is given by, 
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The variance of the manufacturer’s net stock is given by, 
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Using these variance ratios in the objective function we 
may find the optimal values of the unmatched feedback 
controllers. Again, analytically this is very difficult, but 
numerical techniques do exist and they result in values for 
Ti and Tw as shown in the Figure 7.  Figure 7 contains 
some very remarkable features.  For 25734.0  both Ti* 
and Tw* are positive.  However as there are two local 
optimums in the solution space near 25734.0  then the 
optimal Ti* and Tw* is discontinuous in  .   Interestingly, 
the optimal Tw* is negative for 25734.0 .  
 
 
Figure 7. Tuning the unmatched feedback controllers to 
minimise supply chain inventory costs  
 
Using these values in the objective function we may 
illustrate the inventory costs as shown in Figure 8.   Here 
we can see the impact of the discontinuous Ti* and Tw*.   
 
 
Figure 8.  The objective function with unmatched 
controllers with an altruistic retailer 
 
Returning now to the impact of altruistic retailer with 
unmatched controllers on the variances of the order rates 
we have; 
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where we have used the following substitutions as the 
formula is rather complex. 
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These expressions are plotted in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9.  The order variances with unmatched controllers 
(of Ti=Ti* and Tw=Tw*) at with an altruistic retailer
 
Table 1. Enumeration of the three supply chain scenarios 
 Traditional Supply Chain, Ti=Tw=1 Altruistic  Retailer with Matched Controllers Altruistic  Retailer with Unmatched Controllers 
  Retailers Inventory 
Cost 
Man. 
Inventory 
Cost 
Total 
Inventory 
Costs 
Tw*=Ti* 
Retailers 
Inventory 
Cost 
Man. 
Inventory 
Cost 
Total 
Inventory 
Costs 
% benefit 
above 
traditional 
supply chain 
Ti* Tw* 
Retailers 
Inventory 
Cost 
Man. 
Inventory 
Cost 
Total 
Inventory 
Costs 
% benefit 
above 
matched 
supply 
chain 
-1 1 1 2 99999 1 1 2 0 2.2916 1 1.210608 0.43637 1.64698 17.650818 
-0.9 1.004987 0.927826 1.93281 7.0522 1.015004 0.836012 1.85101 4.23202052 2.5032 1.0538 1.212717 0.36862 1.58134 14.568868 
-0.8 1.019803 0.901767 1.92157 5.4967 1.058742 0.703698 1.76244 8.28125428 2.2592 1.12469 1.222485 0.34969 1.57219 10.795020 
-0.7 1.044030 0.907694 1.95172 4.8776 1.115600 0.608615 1.72421 11.6568244 2.7322 1.21156 1.245786 0.35458 1.60038 7.1824312 
-0.6 1.077033 0.934631 2.01166 4.5240 1.186125 0.540233 1.72635 14.1825429 2.7945 1.30595 1.283655 0.36894 1.6526 4.2723559 
-0.5 1.118034 0.976281 2.09431 4.2717 1.266789 0.494717 1.76150 15.8910170 2.8298 1.39529 1.334536 0.38756 1.7221 2.2372178 
-0.4 1.166190 1.030543 2.19673 4.0655 1.354407 0.469610 1.82401 16.9668312 2.8380 1.46523 1.396672 0.40978 1.80646 0.9628588 
-0.3 1.220655 1.098303 2.31895 3.8898 1.446924 0.463397 1.91032 17.6215702 2.8195 1.50119 1.468354 0.43780 1.90616 0.2178938 
-0.2 1.280624 1.182294 2.46291 3.7443 1.543644 0.475552 2.01919 18.0161371 11.318 -1.9466 1.532943 0.45499 1.98794 1.5480031 
-0.1 1.345362 1.286227 2.63158 3.6294 1.644620 0.507137 2.15175 18.2335213 8.0763 -2.16987 1.68466 0.41019 2.09486 2.6443885 
0 1.414213 1.414213 2.82842 3.5414 1.749812 0.561211 2.31102 18.2929485 6.6096 -2.39687 1.8387 0.39577 2.23447 3.3125049 
0.1 1.486606 1.570484 3.05709 3.4738 1.869447 0.631878 2.50132 18.1795635 5.7847 -2.6212 1.994565 0.41342 2.40799 3.7314174 
0.2 1.562049 1.759289 3.32134 3.4201 1.970832 0.756007 2.72684 17.8994008 5.2690 -2.83001 2.153179 0.46502 2.6182 3.9840359 
0.3 1.640121 1.984940 3.62506 3.3762 2.085404 0.907326 2.99273 17.4433165 4.9208 -3.01765 2.314919 0.55435 2.86928 4.1251672 
0.4 1.720465 2.251883 3.97234 3.3394 2.202038 1.101507 3.30354 16.8364639 4.6693 -3.18779 2.479179 0.6869 3.16611 4.1602403 
0.5 1.802775 2.564786 4.36756 3.3080 2.320380 1.343665 3.66404 16.1077385 4.4777 -3.34643 2.645139 0.86864 3.51379 4.1009575 
0.6 1.886796 2.928579 4.81537 3.2805 2.440127 1.639021 4.07914 15.2890968 4.3265 -3.49769 2.812214 1.10518 3.9174 3.9651666 
0.7 1.972308 3.348462 5.32077 3.2561 2.561007 1.992942 4.55395 14.4118412 4.2041 -3.64383 2.980042 1.40206 4.38211 3.7734610 
0.8 2.059126 3.829869 5.88899 3.2340 2.682787 2.410940 5.09372 13.5043066 4.1033 -3.78616 3.148372 1.76476 4.91314 3.5453700 
0.9 2.147091 4.378447 6.52553 3.2137 2.805271 2.898642 5.70391 12.5908988 4.0187 -3.92556 3.317006 2.19882 5.51583 3.2973641 
1 2.236067 5 7.23606 3.1947 2.928303 3.461763 6.39006 11.6914462 3.9468 -4.06275 3.485779 2.70988 6.19566 3.0422908 
Average > 14.1585114 Average > 4.9103729 
7 NUMERICAL  INVESTIGATIONS 
In order to highlight the benefit of the unmatched 
controllers with altruistic retailer we will now enumerate the 
inventory costs and order variances for a range of values in 
the autoregressive demand parameter.  This is shown in 
Table 1. 
We can see that if the retailer is able to alter his 
replenishment rule to incorporate matched feedback 
controllers then total supply chain inventory costs may be 
reduced by as much as 14% when compared to a 
traditional supply chain.   However, if the retailer is will to 
go even further and use appropriately tuned unmatched 
controllers, then a further 4.9% reduction in total supply 
chain inventory costs may be gained. 
 
8 CONCLUSIONS 
The unmatched controller generalised OUT policy 
dominates the matched controller case with an altruistic 
retailer who is concerned with minimising the global supply 
chain inventory costs.  The benefit appears to be 
approximately 5% reduction in the inventory holding and 
backlog costs.  Closer inspection reveals that the altruistic 
contribution of the retailer, in the unmatched case, is even 
higher than in the matched case.  However, the rewards 
are even higher when compared to the traditional supply 
chain where members are only concerned with their local 
inventory holding and backlog costs as the unmatched 
controller case is 18.5% better, on the average.    
In order to gain this advantage the first echelon needs to 
be able to understand the manufacturer’s cost structure, 
the demand signal and the lead-times in the supply chain 
and then alter the structure of his replenishment rules.   
This is, indeed, a very complex task and we imagine that it 
will take considerable industrial engineering efforts to 
achieve. Even if this could technically be done then the 
manufacturer has to understand and use market place 
information and be willing to share some of the economic 
benefit with his customer.   Otherwise, the retailer will have 
no incentive to make the altruistic contribution and smooth 
his replenishment orders. Of course, we have also 
assumed a linear system exists, and thus all unmet 
demand has been backordered and the statistical 
properties of the demand signal are time invariant. 
As a final point, the analysis therein is very complex and 
rather ugly.  Recent work in [10], suggests that much more 
Disney, S.M. and Hosoda, T. (2007) “The benefit of altruistic behaviour achieved by the OUT policy with unmatched proportional feedback gains in a two-echelon supply 
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elegant results can be found by exploiting the “full-state-
feedback” controller, a technique advocated by modern 
control theory.  This will be explored in future research. 
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